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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020590CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from a post-judgment order in a case involving a third degree felony conviction from a court 
of record. The trial court signed the final order on July 18, 2002 (R. 103). Appellant filed 
his Notice of Appeal on July 26,2002 (R. 103). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court abuse his discretion in denying Mr. Lehi's motions to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
1999). Subsidiary findings of fact in this context are reviewed for clear error, and legal 
conclusions, such as whether the trial court strictly complied with Rule 11, are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. This issue was preserved by multiple motions, memoranda, and a hearing 
(R. 44, 56-59, 98, 83-97, 100-101, T. 6/17/2002). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertain and are copied in 
Addendum fTf to this brief: United States Constitution, Amend. XIV § 1; Constitution of 
Utah, Article I § 7; UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-6-44 (2000) and 77-27-13; and UTAH RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Lehi with one count of third degree felony DUI, one count of 
driving on a revoked or suspended license, and one count of driving without registration (R. 
1-2). Judge Anderson appointed William L. Schultz to act as trial counsel (R. 6). Following 
preliminary hearing, Magistrate Anderson ordered Lehi bound over as charged (R. 14). 
On January 28, 2002, Lehi pled guilty to third degree felony DUI and, as part of the 
plea bargain, the prosecutor agreed to move for dismissal of the remaining counts and to 
recommend that Lehi be sentenced to serve ninety (90) days in the San Juan County Jail, 
concurrently with his sentence he was serving on his Blanding case, and that Lehi's New 
Mexico parole continue (R. 37). Mr. Schultz fully explained at the outset of the change of 
plea hearing that Mr. Lehi would be pleading guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's 
recommendation that he receive probation, and that the prosecutor was willing to make this 
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recommendation because Mr. Lehi had done prison time in New Mexico as a result of 
another DUI, and was on continuing parole from New Mexico (R. 108 at 4-6). 
Judge Anderson sentenced Lehi to prison for zero to five years at a hearing on 
February 4,2002, and the clerk filed the final order on February 6,2002 (R. 41). On March 
5, 2002, Schultz moved to withdraw Lehi's guilty plea on the bases of "Defendant's 
frustrated sentencing expectation and his belief that he has a meritorious defense, which was 
waived in the belief he would not receive prison time." (R. 44). Because Lehi wished to 
assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Judge Anderson appointed Happy J. Morgan to 
take over Mr. Lehi's case (R. 53). 
Morgan filed a supplemental motion to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing that (a) the 
plea was not entered properly under Rule 11 and the Utah and United States Constitutions, 
(b) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by failing to inform the author of the 
Presentence Report of the ninety (90) day sentencing recommendation he was bound to 
make, and (c) the plea was involuntary (R. 56-69). The trial court denied the motion (R. 109 
at 4-5; R. 98). 
Before the final written order entered, Ms. Morgan filed a motion to reconsider the 
supplemental motion to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing that the prosecutor had also 
breached the plea agreement by writing a letter to the board of pardons the day after 
sentencing recommending that Lehi serve at least two and a half years (R. 83-97). The 
affidavit of William L. Schultz reflects that Schultz was not aware of the prosecutor's letter 
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to the board of pardons (R. 92). The affidavit of Edwin Birdhand Lehi reflects that Lehi was 
not aware of the prosecutor's letter to the board of pardons, and that his decision to plead was 
caused by the prosecutor's promise to recommend ninety (90) days concurrent with his 
Blanding sentence and continued parole to New Mexico. Lehi's affidavit also states that, had 
Lehi known of the prosecutor's letter to the board of pardons recommending his 
imprisonment for two and a half years, he would have asserted this as a basis for his earlier 
motions to withdraw his plea (R. 93-95). The trial court denied the supplemental motion to 
withdraw the plea (R. 100-101 )(bracketed portion in footnote). Appellant appeals from this 
ruling and from the preliminary ruling denying the motion to withdraw the plea (R. 103). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 7, 2002, Mr. Lehi, acting with counsel, William L. Schultz, entered a 
guilty plea to a third degree felony DUI, which occurred on August 25, 2000, as enhanced 
by two prior convictions (R. 40). At the change of plea hearing, there was no discussion on 
the record concerning the elements of, or factual basis for, the guilty plea (T. 1/7/2002 at 1-
9). The plea affidavit states only the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE 
W/ BAC OF .08 OR GREATER W/ 2 OR MORE PRIOR DUFS W/I 6 YEARS 
(R. 34). The plea affidavit includes no finding of a factual basis for the plea by the Court, 
and includes only the following with regard to the factual basis: 
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These facts provides a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
I WAS DRIVING MY CAR 
I HAD BEEN DRINKING 
I HAVE TWO PRIOR DUIS W/I LAST 6 YEARS 
(R. 34). There was no chemical test in this case (R. 106 at 19). 
Mr. Schultz fully explained at the outset of the change of plea hearing that Mr. Lehi 
would be pleading guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation that he receive 
probation and no further prison time, and that the prosecutor was willing to make this 
recommendation because Mr. Lehi had done prison time in New Mexico as a result of 
another D.U.I., and was on continuing parole from New Mexico (R. 109 at 4-6). The plea 
affidavit indicates that the plea bargain was contingent on the State's making a sentencing 
recommendation, stating as follows: 
.... All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
STATE WILL RECOMMEND 90 DAYS JAIL TIME IN SJ. CTY JAIL 
CONCURRENT W/BLANDING CONTINUED N.M. PAROLE 
(R. 37). The Presentence Report prepared by the State of Utah Adult Probation and Parole 
does not reflect that the prosecutor informed the author of his recommendation of probation, 
but reflects only the following with regard to the plea bargain: 
On January 9, 2002, Edwin Burthand Lehi appeared before the San Juan 
County Seventh District Court in Monticello, Utah, and pled guilty to Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with Priors), a Third Degree 
Felony. Charges of Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a 
class B misdemeanor, and No Registration, a class C Misdemeanor, were 
dismissed. 
Source of Information: 
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Seventh District Court, San Juan County Attorney's Office 
(Presentence Report at page 2). 
The trial court rejected the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at the motion at the 
hearing, stating as follows: 
Okay. Um, the - the issue of whether the, ah - the State breached its 
agreement by its recommendation I think was addressed, ah, in a - 1 think it 
was a letter from Mz. Morgan, ah, acknowledging that that question has been 
addressed. When the prosecutor agrees to make a recommendation, it's only 
the prosecutor that's bound by that record - by that agreement and - and Adult 
Probation & Parole can make a different recommendation. Ah, in fact, my 
ability to rely on what they say depends on them being able to make an 
independent rec - - recommendation from that promise by the prosecutor. 
Um, I believe the, ah - the plea affidavit also adequately addresses the 
elements of the offense. Whether or not those previous DUIs are - are, ah, 
DUIs that are subject to, ah - that should count is something that I - 1 should 
not, in the first instance, decide whether a conviction from another court is 
valid or not. The - (Inaudible) - if there's some problem with those 
convictions, then they're ah, those other courts should get the first chance to 
address any challenge to those convictions. 
Um, and, ah, I also believe that there is a factual basis, ah, for the plea, 
ah, because of the defendant's admission in the Plea Affidavit or the - year. 
I think it was an affidavit. So I'm going to deny the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea and, ah, Mr. Halls, if you'd like to prepare an order, ah, I'd be -
- happy to sign it. That will kind of give us a date, ah, by the denial of the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
(R. 109 at 4-5). 
The trial court's ruling was later memorialized in an order stating as follows: 
This matter came on the Law and Motion calendar for a Motion to 
Withdraw Plea Hearing on the 17th day of June 2002. The State was present 
and represented by Counsel Craig C. Halls, the defendant was present and 
represented by Counsel, Happy Morgan. The Court finds that there is a factual 
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basis for the guilty plea based on the admission of the defendant as stated in 
the Defendant's statement. 
The Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied. 
(R.98). 
Despite his plea bargain agreement to recommend probation and no further prison 
time, in a letter to the Utah Board of Pardons dated February 5, 2002, the day after the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recommended Mr. Lehi's imprisonment for at least two 
and a half years (R. 85-86). A copy of the prosecutor's letter was not sent to Mr. Lehi or Mr. 
Lehi's counsel (R. 86). His letter stated in full as follows: 
In accordance with Section 77-27-13(5), the following information is 
respectfully submitted to the Board of Pardons: 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME 
Mr. Lehi was originally charged on a 3 count Information. Count 1: 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a Third Degree felony based 
upon his prior history. Count 2: Driving on a Suspended or Revoked 
Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor. Count 3: No Registration, a 
Class C Misdemeanor. 
PLEA BARGAINING 
Defendant pled to Count 1. Count 2 and 3 were dismissed. 
MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
This office feels that they are all aggravating circumstances in this case. 
The aggravating circumstances involved in this case include the severity of the 
previous criminal history and that can be observed in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigative Report which indicates four and a half pages of alcohol and 
violent behavior. By the nature of his prior incarceration history, Mr. Lehi is 
currently on parole from the state of New Mexico, having spent 1 year in jail 
in New Mexico for a DUI that occurred between the time that this DUI 
occurred and the time that he was sentenced for this DUI. Mr. Lehi spent 1 
year in the New Mexico prison before he could be brought back to the state of 
Utah for purpose of sentencing on this conviction. 
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Mr. Lehi has a severe alcohol problem and the recommendation in this 
Prosecutor's Report is based somewhat on the protection of the community 
from Mr. Lehi. 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
The original DUI report and the Pre-Sentencing Investigative Report 
are included in this packet. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
There are no victims or restitution involved in this DUI. 
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION 
Because of the defendant's extensive prior record, it is my belief that 
Mr. Lehi will not be rehabilitated in an in-patient alcohol program or in 
counseling. I believe that he is a severe and real risk to anyone on the 
highways in the state of Utah and to himself. I believe that he should be 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a significant amount of time and on 
these charges I believe ought to be for 2 lA years. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2002. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IsL 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Report to the Board of Pardons to: The 
State of Utah, Board of Pardons, at 448 East 6400 South, Suite 300, Murray, 
Utah 84107 this 5th day of February 2002, by placing same postage prepaid in 
the Monticello Post Office. 
is/ 
Julie Robinson 
The trial court denied Lehi's supplemental motions to withdraw the guilty plea made 
on the basis of the prosecutor's violation of the plea agreement in an order stating as follows: 
Defendant, for the third time, has moved the court to permit him to 
withdraw his guilty plea. This time he adds a claim that the prosecutor 
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violated the plea agreement by recommending after sentencing, that his 
incarceration be for at least two years and a half. 
The court does not agree that an agreement to recommend a particular 
sentence binds the prosecutor not to comment to the board of pardons after 
sentence is imposed. The agreement deals with the prosecutor's 
recommendation to the court on what the sentence would be, not 
recommendations, if any, to the board of pardons on the length of a prison 
sentence. 
Though this case does not require this court to reach the question, this 
court disagrees that a defendant should always be permitted to withdraw a 
guilty plea if the prosecutor fails to follow through on every aspect of a plea 
bargain. Sometimes the plea bargain does not foresee every eventuality and 
does not expressly provide what the prosecutor may and may not do. In that 
circumstance, it seems unfair to impose such a drastic remedy if the prosecutor 
guesses wrong, especially since the prosecutor has no right to undo a plea 
bargain if the defendant fails to comply. [Consider, for example, a murdered 
who pleads to simple murder instead of aggravated murder on the condition 
that he reveal all of his criminal conduct, including forgeries of historic 
writings. If he fails to reveal the truth, he still cannot be prosecuted for 
aggravated murder.] 
(R. 100-101)(bracketed portion in footnote). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should order the trial court to permit Lehi to withdraw his guilty plea, 
because the trial court did not fulfill his burden in taking the plea, imposed by Rule 11 and 
the United States and Utah Constitutions, to make a clear record of the legal elements and 
factual basis underlying the plea, and Lehi's understanding of the law in relationship to the 
facts. Additionally, this Court should order the trial court to permit Lehi to withdraw his 
guilty plea, because the prosecutor failed to inform the author of the Presentence Report or 
the board of pardons concerning his agreement to recommend that Lehi receive probation, 
and instead, the day after sentencing wrote a letter to the board of pardons, omitting his 
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promised probation recommendation from his summary of the plea bargain, and including 
his recommendation that Lehi spend two and a half years in prison. Regardless of the trial 
court's disagreement with it, well established constitutional law recognizes that when a 
prosecutor breaches a plea agreement, the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Improper Entry of the Plea 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 governs the entry of guilty pleas, and states, 
in relevant part as follows: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept tne plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual 
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to 
admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk 
of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, 
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
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imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on 
the record or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the 
court has established that the defendant has read, understood, 
and acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that 
the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed 
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, 
or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
Utah Courts recognize the valuable purposes of the rule and strict compliance with 
it to insure that guilty pleas are entered and important constitutional rights are waived in a 
knowing and voluntarily manner, and to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process by 
requiring courts to ascertain the terms of plea bargains and their voluntary nature on the 
record. See, e.g., State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294,1299 (Utah 1986). Failure to strictly comply 
with any aspect of Rule 11 constitutes good cause for the withdrawal of the plea as a matter 
of law. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 11(e)(4) requires the courts to establish that the defendant understands both the 
elements and nature of the offense, and also requires the courts to establish a factual basis 
for the plea. It states, in relevant part as follows: 
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4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual 
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to 
admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk 
of conviction[.] 
The failure to clearly establish the elements of the offense and establish the necessary facts 
underlying a guilty plea is an independent constitutional basis for withdrawal of the plea, 
because a plea cannot be characterized as constitutionally voluntary unless the record reflects 
that the defendant understands the law in relation to the facts and admits sufficient facts to 
justify the conviction. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996)(ordering 
withdrawal of guilty plea to capital murder for omission of intent element in entry of the 
plea). See also, e.g. State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440,444 (Utah 1983)(arson guilty plea 
involuntary because record indicated confusion regarding mens red); State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988). 
This Court's decision in State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1993), decided 
before Rule 11 expressly required a factual basis, provides a useful discussion of the 
historically recognized need for an adequate factual basis for a valid guilty plea. 
Stillings explains as follows: 
Although Utah's Rule 11 does not specifically require a factual basis for 
a guilty plea, as does the federal counterpart, Fed. R. Com. P. 11(f), Utah case 
law has imposed such a requirement on, at least, pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. Our 
supreme court recently addressed the need for evidence of a factual basis as 
indicia of substantial compliance "with constitutional and procedural 
requirements." Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992) (involving a 
pre-Gibbons plea). In Willett the supreme court described this factual basis 
requirement as a demonstration from the record as a whole of "facts that would 
substantiate the prosecution of the charges at trial." Id. at 862. Willett links a 
record of "facts that would place the defendant at risk of conviction should the 
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matter proceed to trial" with the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court first enunciated the need for a factual basis for 
the plea as a requirement for entry of guilty pleas in State v. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). Breckenridge "suggested that a valid guilty plea 
required a 'record of facts1 showing either 'that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant, or that the defendant has for some other 
legitimate reason intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea.'" Willett 
842 P.2d at 862 (quoting Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 440). In Breckenridge, the 
court held that when the record did not demonstrate that the defendant 
understood the nature and elements of the crime charged, the defendant could 
not voluntarily plead guilty. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444. The Willet court 
clarified the Breckenridge holding, stating that the record must reveal either 
facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that 
would suggest a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial, "not 
merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for entering the plea." 
Willett. 842 P.2d at 862. 
Stillings at 671-72 (footnote omitted). 
More recently, this Court reiterated the need for an explicit record of the defendant's 
understanding of the relationship between the law and the facts, in State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 
1065 (Utah App. 2000), affd, 31 P.3d 529 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
If a defendant does "not understand the nature and elements of the crime to 
which he pled guilty," his guilty plea is involuntarily made. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d at 443-44. '"Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of 
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant 
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'" Id- at 444 
(alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466, 
89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) (footnote omitted)). 
Additionally, a defendant's "understanding of the elements of the charges and 
the relationship of the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or 
incomplete examination." Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. Accordingly, a trial 
court's "failure to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of the offense 
is fatal to a guilty plea conviction." Pharos, 798 P.2d at 777. 
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Ostler at 1069-1070. In the instant matter, the plea was not entered in strict compliance with 
Rule 11 or the related constitutional law, because the trial court made no record of the 
relevant elements or factual basis underlying the plea, or of Lehi's understanding of the law 
in relationship to the facts. 
The version of the DUI statute, §41 -6-44, applicable on August 25,2000, provides the 
elements, stating in relevant part as follows: 
(1) As used in this section: 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or 
alcohol-related 
reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other 
state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of 
the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or 
alcohol-related reckless driving 
if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. 
Sec. 815; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local 




(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
chemical test given 
within two hours of the alleged operation or 
physical control shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration 
of .08 grams or greater; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration 
in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath. 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
The plea affidavit states only the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE 
W/ BAC OF .08 OR GREATER W/ 2 OR MORE PRIOR DUFS W/I 6 YEARS 
The plea affidavit includes no finding of a factual basis for the plea by the Court, and 
includes only the following with regard to the factual basis: 
These facts provides a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
I WAS DRIVING MY CAR 
I HAD BEEN DRINKING 
I HAVE TWO PRIOR DUIS W/I LAST 6 YEARS 
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(R. 34). There was no chemical test performed (R. 106 at 19). Accordingly, the plea 
affidavit's recitation of the elements and factual basis should have indicated that Lehi was 
"under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug 
to a degree that rendered him] incapable of safely operating a vehicle." 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii), 
supra. Particularly given the absence of a chemical test to establish the level of alcohol in 
Mr. Lehi's system, and the absence of any discussion in the plea affidavit or on the record 
concerning the degree to which Lehi was under the influence, the plea affidavit did not 
adequately establish that Mr. Lehi understood the elements of the offense that the 
government would have had to show, or that there was a factual basis for the plea. Thus, the 
affidavit failed to properly state the elements or establish a factual basis for the plea. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, supra. 
During the plea colloquy, the Court did not discuss the elements of the offense or 
factual basis more accurately and thoroughly with Mr. Lehi, and the Court did not 
specifically find that there was a factual basis for the plea. This is an independent basis for 
withdrawal of the plea. See, e.g., Stillings; Ostler; Thurman; Breckenridge; Copeland, supra. 
In ruling on this particular issue, the trial court stated, 
Um, and, ah, I also believe that there is a factual basis, ah, for the plea, ah, 
because of the defendant's admission in the Plea Affidavit or the - year. I 
think it was an affidavit. So I'm going to deny the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea and, ah, Mr. Halls, if you'd like to prepare an order, ah, I'd be -
- happy to sign it. That will kind of give us a date, ah, by the denial of the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
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(T. 6/17/2002 at 4-5). 
There is no evidence to marshal in support of this clearly erroneous finding by the trial 
court, because, as discussed above, the plea affidavit and plea colloquy do not establish a 
factual basis for the plea, do not accurately state the elements of the offense, and do not 
establish that Lehi understood either or the relationship of the law and the facts. Because the 
record of the entry of the plea does not correctly state the elements or factual basis, or 
establish Lehi's understanding of the law in relationship to the facts, the errors are "'fatal to 
the guilty plea conviction.'" Ostler, supra. 
II. Breach of the Plea Agreement 
A. Factual Background 
Mr. Schultz fully explained at the outset of the change of plea hearing that Mr. Lehi 
would be pleading guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation that he receive 
probation and no further prison time, and that the prosecutor was willing to make this 
recommendation because Mr. Lehi had done prison time in New Mexico as a result of 
another D.U.I., and was on continuing parole from New Mexico (R. 108 at 4-6). The plea 
affidavit indicates that the plea bargain was contingent on the State's making a sentencing 
recommendation, stating, 
.... All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
STATE WILL RECOMMEND 90 DAYS JAIL TIME IN S.J. CTY JAIL 
CONCURRENT W/BLANDING CONTINUED N.M. PAROLE 
(R. 37). 
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Lehi's affidavit confirms that his guilty plea was induced by the prosecution's 
agreement to recommend ninety days in jail, concurrent with Lehi's Blanding sentence, and 
continued New Mexico Parole (R. 93-95). 
The presentence report prepared by the State of Utah Adult Probation and Parole 
reflects only the following with regard to the plea bargain: 
On January 9, 2002, Edwin Burthand Lehi appeared before the San Juan 
County Seventh District Court in Monticello, Utah, and pled guilty to Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with Priors), a Third Degree 
Felony. Charges of Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a 
class B misdemeanor, and No Registration, a class C Misdemeanor, were 
dismissed. 
Source of Information: 
Seventh District Court, San Juan County Attorney's Office 
(Presentence Report at page 2). The Presentence Report does not reflect that the prosecutor 
conveyed his sentencing recommendation to the author of the Presentence Report, or 
informed the author that the guilty plea was contingent on this recommendation. Id.l 
At the sentencing hearing on February 4, 2002, the prosecutor made a 
recommendation consistent with the plea bargain, but the trial court opted to sentence Mr. 
Lehi in accordance with the Presentence Report (R. 107 at 9-10). In a letter to the Utah 
Board of Pardons dated February 5,2002, the prosecutor recommended imprisonment for at 
least two and a half years (R. 85-86). His letter stated in foil as follows: 
1
 State v.Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989), holds that a prosecutor's plea 
bargain agreement to make sentencing recommendations does not bind other state 
agencies to make the same recommendations. 
Defense counsel informed the trial court of this law (T. 6/17/2002 at 4-5). 
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In accordance with Section 77-27-13(5), the following information is 
respectfully submitted to the Board of Pardons: 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME 
Mr. Lehi was originally charged on a 3 count Information. Count 1: 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a Third Degree felony based 
upon his prior history. Count 2: Driving on a Suspended or Revoked 
Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor. Count 3: No Registration, a 
Class C Misdemeanor. 
PLEA BARGAINING 
Defendant pled to Count 1. Count 2 and 3 were dismissed. 
MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
This office feels that they are all aggravating circumstances in this case. 
The aggravating circumstances involved in this case include the severity of the 
previous criminal history and that can be observed in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigative Report which indicates four and a half pages of alcohol and 
violent behavior. By the nature of his prior incarceration history, Mr. Lehi is 
currently on parole from the state of New Mexico, having spent 1 year in jail 
in New Mexico for a DUI that occurred between the time that this DUI 
occurred and the time that he was sentenced for this DUI. Mr. Lehi spent 1 
year in the New Mexico prison before he could be brought back to the state of 
Utah for purpose of sentencing on this conviction. 
Mr. Lehi has a severe alcohol problem and the recommendation in this 
Prosecutor's Report is based somewhat on the protection of the community 
from Mr. Lehi. 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
The original DUI report and the Pre-Sentencing Investigative Report 
are included in this packet. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
There are no victims or restitution involved in this DUI. 
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION 
Because of the defendant's extensive prior record, it is my belief that 
Mr. Lehi will not be rehabilitated in an in-patient alcohol program or in 
counseling. I believe that he is a severe and real risk to anyone on the 
highways in the state of Utah and to himself. I believe that he should be 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a significant amount of time and on 
these charges I believe ought to be for 2 lA years. 




Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Report to the Board of Pardons to: 
The State of Utah, Board of Pardons, at 448 East 6400 South, Suite 300, 
Murray, Utah 84107 this 5th day of February 2002, by placing same postage 
prepaid in the Monticello Post Office. 
is/ 
Julie Robinson 
(R. 85-86). A copy of this letter was never sent to Mr. Lehi or Mr. Lehi's counsel (R. 
86). 
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw based on the breach of the plea 
agreement in an order stating as follows: 
Defendant, for the third time, has moved the court to permit him to 
withdraw his guilty plea. This time he adds a claim that the prosecutor 
violated the plea agreement by recommending after sentencing, that his 
incarceration be for at least two years and a half. 
The court does not agree that an agreement to recommend a particular 
sentence binds the prosecutor not to comment to the board of pardons after 
sentence is imposed. The agreement deals with the prosecutor's 
recommendation to the court on what the sentence would be, not 
recommendations, if any, to the board of pardons on the length of a prison 
sentence. 
Though this case does not require this court to reach the question, this 
court disagrees that a defendant should always be permitted to withdraw a 
guilty plea if the prosecutor fails to follow through on every aspect of a plea 
bargain. Sometimes the plea bargain does not foresee every eventuality and 
does not expressly provide what the prosecutor may and may not do. In that 
circumstance, it seems unfair to impose such a drastic remedy if the prosecutor 
guesses wrong, especially since the prosecutor has no right to undo a plea 
bargain if the defendant fails to comply. [Consider, for example, a murdered 
who pleads to simple murder instead of aggravated murder on the condition 
20 
that he reveal all of his criminal conduct, including forgeries of historic 
writings. If he fails to reveal the truth, he still cannot be prosecuted for 
aggravated murder.] 
(R. 100-101 )(bracketed portion in footnote). 
B. Relevant Law 
The section of the code the prosecutor cited at the outset of his letter to the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Paroles, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-13 (5), provides, 
(5) (a) In all cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the 
judge imposing the sentence may within 30 days from the date of the sentence, 
mail to the chief executive of the board a statement in writing setting out the 
term for which, in his opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned, 
and any information he may have regarding the character of the offender or 
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances connected with the offense for 
which the offender has been convicted. In addition, the prosecutor shall in all 
cases, within 30 days from the date of sentence, forward in writing to the chief 
executive of the board a full and complete description of the crime, a written 
record of any plea bargain entered into, a statement of the mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances or both, all investigative reports, a victim impact 
statement referring to physical, mental, or economic loss suffered, and any 
other information the prosecutor believes will be relevant to the board. These 
statements shall be preserved in the files of the board. 
(emphasis added). The statute invites judges to make sentencing recommendations, but does 
not require prosecutors to make sentencing recommendations. Id. This section requires 
prosecutors to inform the board of the terms of the plea bargain. Id. 
In the instant matter, the prosecutor did not inform the board accurately of the terms 
of the plea agreement, but opted to omit the key portion of the plea bargain, that he was 
supposed to be recommending probation for Mr. Lehi, and ninety (90) days of jail time to run 
concurrently with another sentence, and continuing parole to New Mexico, and no further 
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prison (R. 108 at 4-5). The prosecutor did not reveal the rationale for the plea bargain 
expressed by defense counsel at the outset of the change of plea hearing, that Mr. Lehi had 
recently experienced prison in New Mexico and was on continuing parole with New Mexico 
(R. 108 at 4-5). Instead, the prosecutor wrote a letter vilifying Mr. Lehi and his criminal 
record, and recommending his imprisonment for two and a half years (R. 85-86, quoted in 
full supra). 
Regardless of the trial court's disagreement with it, federal and state constitutional law 
both recognize that when a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement, this is an independent basis 
for withdrawal of a guilty plea, regardless of whether the prosecutor's failure to perform in 
compliance with his agreement influenced the court's sentencing decision. See, e.g., State 
v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266,1275-76 (Utah 1988). In Copeland. it was unclear whether the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement, or made an illusory one. On appeal, the Copeland 
court stated, in relevant part, as follows: 
It is well established that a prosecutor may not make promises which induce 
a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those promises. "[A] constant factor is 
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of 
the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York. 404 
U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971). In Santobello. the 
prosecutor promised not to make any recommendations concerning the 
defendant's sentence in return for the defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense 
than he had been charged with. Id. at 258. That promise was not kept. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case even though the 
recommendation had not influenced the trial judge. 
Utah has followed the Santobello precedent. In State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 
129 (Utah 1976), the prosecutor promised to recommend probation to the 
sentencing judge. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the State had not 
fulfilled its promise. This Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the recommendation had been included in the probation 
report. We held that if it had not been included, the defendant was "entitled to 
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have his sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his 
bargain." Id. at 130. 
In State v. Kav. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), this Court, examining the 
possible double jeopardy implications of a broken plea agreement, stated: 
If the . . . . prosecutor refuses to comply with the terms of the 
plea [after it is entered and accepted], the defendant may choose 
to withdraw the plea . . . . Once the court or prosecution has 
entered into a plea agreement and that plea has been accepted 
and entered, neither one may unilaterally withdraw from the 
agreement without a showing that facts analogous to those 
warranting a mistrial exist (at least in the absence of a breach of 
the agreement by the defendant). 
Id- at 1304. In light of Santobello, our holding in Garfield, and the discussion 
of guilty pleas in Kay, defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea if the 
State made a promise it did not or could not fulfill. 
Id. at 1275-76. It does not matter that the prosecutor's adverse sentencing recommendation 
went to the board of pardons after the sentencing in the trial court and had no impact on the 
trial court's sentence, because the plain terms of the plea agreement bound the prosecutor to 
recommend probation, and Lehi was entitled to the benefit of the bargain, regardless of 
whether it had any bearing on what the trial court did. See Copeland. 
The prosecutor undoubtedly knew or should have known that the board of pardons is 
the ultimate sentencing authority in prison cases under Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
scheme. See, e.g., Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991)("If the trial 
judge sends [a] defendant to prison, the judge does not determine the number of years the 
defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered discretion of the board of pardons 
"). The trial court's finding that the plea agreement bound the prosecutor only to make 
sentencing recommendations to the court and did not bar his recommendations to the board 
to keep is clearly erroneous, and there is no evidence to marshal in support of it. The plea 
affidavit, signed by the prosecutor (R. 39), reflected these terms of the plea agreement: 
STATE WILL RECOMMEND 90 DAYS JAIL TIME IN S J. CTY JAIL 
CONCURRENT W/BLANDING CONTINUED N.M. PAROLE 
(R. 37). 
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As defense counsel Schultz noted at the outset of the plea hearing, the prosecutor 
agreed to recommend that Lehi serve ninety (90) days in jail, and agreed not to recommend 
any additional prison time to that Lehi had already served in New Mexico (R. 108 at 4-5). 
There was nothing in the plea agreement that limited the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation obligation to proceedings in the trial court. Had the agreement 
contemplated that the prosecutor would recommend probation to the trial court one day and 
two and a half years of prison time to the board the next, Lehi would not have entered into 
the agreement, because Lehi's plea was induced by the probation recommendation (R. 93-
95). 
Contrary to the trial court's implication, this case did not involve a prosecutor who 
"guessed wrong" about his obligations in a plea bargain. Indeed, the record is devoid of any 
such claim by the prosecutor, or any evidence to marshal in support of such a notion. Rather, 
this case involved a prosecutor whose plea offer induced a man to plead guilty to a felony 
with the understanding that the prosecutor would recommend ninety (90) days in jail and no 
further prison (R. 93-95; R. 108 at 4-5), and who turned around the day after sentencing and 
recommended to the ultimate sentencing authority that Mr. Lehi serve two and a half years 
in prison, and who failed in his statutory duty to accurately inform the ultimate sentencing 
authority of the terms of the plea bargain when he omitted all mention of his promised 
probation recommendation (R. 85-86). 
Mr. Lehi was and is entitled to have the prosecutor comply with his end of the plea 
bargain, and because of the prosecutor's failure to do this, Mr. Lehi is entitled to withdraw 
his plea. See, e.g., Copeland; Kay, supra. 
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Conclusion 
On the basis of the foregoing errors, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial 
of the motions to withdraw the guilty pleas and remand this case for trial. 
DATED this 1 st day of November, 2002. 
Mfepf »Y J. MORGAN 
Counsel for Mr. Lehi 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, PO 
BOX 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 1st day of November, 2002. 
/ I V 
• ' / / • 
L^tfeppy Morgan 
Counsel for Mr. Lehi 
25 
Addendum 1 
STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV §1 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2000) 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance with Section 
62A-8-107; 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this 
section or alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including 
punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency 
screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the 
Board of Substance Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two hours of the 
alleged operation or physical control shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if 
the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court may order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court may order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree felony. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison 
sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring the person to 
obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse 
treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised fofiow-tnrough after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the court may require the 
person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any 
sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a 
conviction for a violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to: participate in a screening and assessment; and an educational 
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, 
mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and assessment, an 
educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second, or 
subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the 
court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and assessment, educational 
series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to pay all fines and fees, including fees for 
restitution and treatment costs, the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a 
failure to comply. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's 
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a 
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of 
Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation 
of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection 
with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this 
Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 
41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of Section 41-6-
44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under 
Subsection (2) if the violation is committed within a period of six years from the date of 
the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection 
(12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period 
the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the 
record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order the 
operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to be 
suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180 days, or one year to remove 
from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the persons license under this Subsection (12)(b), the 
court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke 
that person's driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate corrections, 
probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider of the 
defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, so that 
the person's compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place an 
electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring equipment in 
the residence of the person or other specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse 
testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the person is 
subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school 
educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities and the 
person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered directly 
by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a 
private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract with a 
probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (b) shall monitor the person's 
compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and 
court orders received under this article and shall notify the court of any failure to comply 
with or complete that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the person 
is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of 
waivers oy the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is admissible 
evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, then if the court does 
not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii), then the court 
shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for the 
person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-13 
§§ 77-27-13. Board of Pardons and Parole - Duties of the judiciary, the Department of 
Corrections, and law enforcement - Removal of material from files 
(1) The chief executive officer and employees of each penal or correctional institution 
shall cooperate fully with the board, permit board members free access to offenders, and 
furnish the board with pertinent information regarding an offender's physical, mental, and 
social history and his institutional record of behavior, discipline, work, efforts of self-
improvement, and attitude toward society. 
(2) The Department of Corrections shall furnish pertinent information it has and shall 
provide a copy of the pre-sentence report and any other investigative reports to the board. 
In all cases where a pre-sentence report has not been completed, the department shall 
make a post-sentence report and shall provide a copy of it to the board as soon as 
possible. The department shall provide the board, upon request, any additional 
investigations or information needed by the board to reach a decision or conduct a 
hearing. 
(3) The department shall make its facilities available to the board to carry out its 
functions. 
(4) Law enforcement officials responsible for the offender's arrest, conviction, and 
sentence shall furnish all pertinent data requested by the board. 
(5) (a) In all cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge imposing the 
sentence may within 30 days from the date of the sentence, mail to the chief executive of 
the board a statement in writing setting out the term for which, in his opinion, the 
offender sentenced should be imprisoned, and any information he may have regarding the 
character of the offender or any mitigating or aggravating circumstances connected with 
the offense for which the offender has been convicted. In addition, the prosecutor shall in 
all cases, within 30 days from the date of sentence, forward in writing to the chief 
executive of the board a full and complete description of the crime, a written record of 
any plea bargain entered into, a statement of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
or both, all investigative reports, a victim impact statement referring to physical, mental, 
or economic loss suffered, and any other information the prosecutor believes will be 
relevant to the board. These statements shall be preserved in the files of the board. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), the board may remove from its files any: 
(i) statement that it is not going to rely on in its decisionmaking process; 
(ii) information found to be incorrect by a court, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or 
administrative agency; or 
(iii) duplicative materials. 
(6) The chief executive officer of any penal or correctional institution shall permit 
offenders to send mail to the board without censorship. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, 
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to 
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; -
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that 
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or 
is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
wnat agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the 
plea; and. 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement. If the 
defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request 
or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included onense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court. -
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney. -
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the 
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-
103. 
Addendum 2 
TRIAL COURT RULINGS 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0 . Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone: (435)587-2128 
Fax No. (435)587-3119 
S/(i 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0017-85 
Case Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff 
for transportation to the Utah State Prison and execution to the sentence given herein. 
There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed, and defendant having 
been convicted of the offense(s) of: 
Count 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
(WITH PRIORS), a third degree felony. 
Count 2: Dismissed 
Count 3: Dismissed 
Defendant being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by William 
L. Schultz, defendant is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five 
years. Defendant has already paid his transportation restitution directly to the San Juan County 
Sheriff. 
DATED this W day of ^P^J^^^r ^O^. 
^Mj^ r^ « S^JJA^S^ 
SIGNATURE STAMP USED WITH APPROVAL 
J^X 
Lyle Rr Anderson 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST: 
^<uy^ 
Clerk of the COUJ 
SEVENTH DISifttC" U K . 1 * -
FILED 1!" - Q T*" 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
Case No. 0017-85 
This matter came on the Law and Motion calendar for a Motion 
to Withdraw Plea Hearing on the 17th day of June, 2002. The 
State was present and represented by Counsel Craig C. Halls, the 
defendant was present and represented by Counsel, Happy Morgan. 
The Court finds that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea 
based on the admission of the defendant as stated m the 
Defendant's Statement. 
The Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied. 
DATED t h i s 
L 
^ e R T A n d e r ^ 
"1 s t r i c t Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a true copy of the 
foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to William L. Schultz, Attorney 
for the defendant; Adult Probation Department at 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 
84532; and to the Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020 
DATED this r day of _ ^eJjAJuU^ p^Ci^ 
tzfcu^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 -—- day of July, 2002, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above 
Ruling on Motion to Withdraw Plea to Happy Morgan, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 8 S 100 E, Moab, UT 84532. 
Clerk A 
1:41 P.M. 
17TH JUNE 2002 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
3 THE COURT: Edwin Birdhand Lehi, 0017-85. 
4 II All right. Urn, I really scheduled it for a hearing 
5 just because at the time it was submitted for decision I did 
6 II not see an objection in the file from the County Attorney. 
7 II Ifve now seen the objection from the County Attorney and I'm 
8 II prepared to go ahead and decide this without, ah, any oral 
9 || argument. 
10 || Is there anything that you feel like you need to add 
11 || to your memorandum, Mz. Morgan? 
12 MZ. MORGAN: Your Honor, I feel like itfs been 
13 || thoroughly briefed and I don't have anything to add that's not 
14 || in the written document. 
15 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Halls? 
16 || MR. HALLS: I will stand on the — our objection, 
17 || Your Honor. 
18 COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Urn, the — the issue of whether 
20 || the, ah — the State breached its agreement by its 
21 || recommendation I think was addressed, ah, in a — I think it 
22 || was a letter from Mz. Morgan, ah, acknowledging that that 
23 || question has been addressed. When the prosecutor agrees to 
24 || make a recommendation, it's only the prosecutor that's bound 
25 || by that record — by that agreement and — and Adult Probation 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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& Parole can make a different recommendation. Ah, in fact, my 
ability to rely on what they say depends on them being able to 
make an independent rec- — recommendation from that promise 
by the prosecutor. 
Urn, I believe the, ah — the plea affidavit also 
adequately addresses the elements of the offense. Whether or 
not those previous DUIs are — are, ah, DUIs that are subject 
to, ah — that should count is something that I — I should 
not, in the first instance, decide whether a conviction from 
another court is valid or not. The — (Inaudible) — if 
there1s some problem with those convictions, then they're — 
ah, those other courts should get the first chance to address 
any challenge to those convictions. 
Urn, and, ah, I also believe that there is a factual 
basis, ah, for the plea, ah, because of the defendant's 
admission in the Plea Affidavit or the — yeah. I think it 
was an affidavit. So I'm going to deny the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea and, ah, Mr. Halls, if you'd like to prepare 
an order, ah, I'd be — 
MR. HALLS: I will. 
THE COURT: — happy to sign it. That will kind of 
give us a date, ah, by the denial of the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea. 
(The above entitled proceedings were completed.) 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
C,LED
 JUL 1 8 2002 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County 
State Of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN BURTHAND LEHI, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 0017-85 
Defendant, for the third time, has moved the court to permit 
him to withdraw his guilty plea. This time he adds a claim that 
the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by recommending after 
sentencing, that his incarceration be for at least two years and a 
half. 
The court does not agree that an agreement to recommend a 
particular sentence binds the prosecutor not to comment to the 
board of pardons after sentence is imposed. The agreement deals 
with the prosecutor's recommendation to the court on what the 
sentence would be, not recommendations, if any, to the board of 
pardons on the length of a prison sentence. 
Though this case does not require this court to reach the 
question, this court disagrees that a defendant should always be 
permitted to withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecutor fails to 
follow through on every aspect of a plea bargain. Sometimes the 
plea bargain does not foresee every eventuality and does not 
expressly provide what the prosecutor may and may not do. In that 
circumstance, it seems unfair to impose such a drastic remedy if 
the prosecutor guesses wrong, especially since the prosecutor has 
no right to undo a plea bargain if the defendant fails to comply.1 




 Consider, for example, a murderer who pleads to simple 
murder instead of aggravated murder on the condition that he 
reveal all of his criminal conduct, including forgeries of 
historic writings. If he fails to reveal the truth, he still 
cannot be prosecuted for aggravated murder. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the { b day of July, 2002, I 
mailed/hand delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
RULING to the following: 
Craig Halls 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Happy Morgan 
Attorney at Law 
8 South 100 East 
Moab, UT 84532 
n 
%CAXM\ 
Deputy Clerk 
